Yeto Anom Rahmadana, . (2026) DINAMIKA POLITIK DALAM IMPLEMENTASI FASILITAS LIKUIDITAS PEMBIAYAAN PERUMAHAN (FLPP): Analisis Power-Interest Networks Terhadap Manfaat Distribusi Kebijakan. Skripsi thesis, Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jakarta.
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Abstract
The Housing Financing Liquidity Facility (FLPP) program is a government policy instrument providing subsidized housing finance for Low-Income Communities (MBR). Although normatively designed to expand housing inclusivity, its implementation is heavily shaped by political dynamics involving power contests and actor interests. This study analyzes how power asymmetry and interests within the FLPP policy network shape benefit distribution and its implications for distributive justice among target groups. Utilizing a qualitative case study of FLPP implementation (2024–2025) in West Java Province, this research integrates Merilee S. Grindle’s Politics of Policy Implementation, Thompson and Martin’s power-interest positioning, and Deborah Stone’s distributive justice. Data were collected via in-depth interviews, documentation, and literature reviews. The results reveal a significant power imbalance within the network. High Power-High Interest actors, the Ministry of PKP, BP TAPERA, and commercial banks-exert hegemonic control over regulations, budget allocations, and benefit vetting. Conversely, primary target groups like informal sector MBR (non-fixed income) and construction MSMEs occupy a Low Power-High Interest position, leaving them vulnerable to structural exclusion and marginalization. The study identifies a principle-outcome mismatch and a policy paradox, where benefit distribution shifts from a need-based principle to a rigid, desert-based financial eligibility standard that privileges formal workers with fixed incomes. Ultimately, FLPP implementation transforms into a political arena where power relations and interest dominance dictate who gains access, benefits, and positioning in national housing policy. Keywords: Housing Financing Liquidity Facility (FLPP), policy implementation, power-interest networks, distributive justice, policy paradox, Low-Income Communities (MBR).
| Item Type: | Thesis (Skripsi) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | [No.Panggil: 2210413107] [Pembimbing: Jerry Indrawan] [Penguji 1: Ridwan] [Penguji 2: Fatkhuri] |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Keywords: Housing Financing Liquidity Facility (FLPP), policy implementation, power-interest networks, distributive justice, policy paradox, Low-Income Communities (MBR) |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JC Political theory J Political Science > JQ Political institutions Asia J Political Science > JS Local government Municipal government |
| Divisions: | Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik > Program Studi Ilmu Politik (S1) |
| Depositing User: | YETO ANOM RAHMADANA |
| Date Deposited: | 24 Aug 2026 03:32 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Aug 2026 03:32 |
| URI: | http://repository.upnvj.ac.id/id/eprint/53234 |
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