

Abstrak

Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis konfigurasi faktor atau komponen pembentuk *Political Bargaining Model* dalam proses negosiasi kebijakan divestasi saham PTFI tahun 2014-2018 dengan tujuan menjelaskan kesenjangan antara agenda *Resource Nationalism* yang melatarbelakangi dimulainya negosiasi dan hasil negosiasi yang kemudian dicapai. Melalui pengaplikasian komprehensif dan sistematis dari teori *Political Bargaining Model* (PBM) oleh Lorraine Eden, penelitian ini mengeksplorasi proses negosiasi dalam periode 2014-2018. Pendekatan kualitatif diterapkan melalui teknik pengumpulan data *archival and document-based research* serta teknik analisis *content analysis* berbasis komponen operasional PBM, yakni *Goals*, *Resources*, dan *Constraints*.

Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa konfigurasi dan interaksi antara ketiga komponen negosiasi membentuk mekanisme yang memicu transisi *bargaining process* dari konfliktual ke harmonis, di mana amplifikasi *Constraints* memicu kesetaraan besaran *Stakes* yang kemudian mendorong kedua aktor untuk menyelaraskan tujuan dan kepentingannya masing-masing dalam rangka mencapai *bargaining outcomes* yang saling menguntungkan. Namun, dalam perkembangan konfigurasi komponen negosiasi, terdapat tiga problematika yang menghambat kemampuan pemerintah untuk mengoptimalkan *bargaining outcomes*, yakni politisasi *Resource Nationalism*, disparitas antara kontrol manajerial dan operasional atas sumber daya, serta penguncian kontraktual atas rezim investasi. Hal ini berakibat pada *deal arrangement* yang suboptimal menurut perspektif *Resource Nationalism*.

Kata Kunci: *Political Bargaining*, Divestasi Saham, Freeport, Indonesia, *Resource Nationalism*

Abstract

This study aims to analyze the configuration of determining factors or operational components which form political bargaining model in the PT Freeport Indonesia share divestiture negotiation process in order to explain the gap between the Resource Nationalism agenda that initiated the bargain and the bargaining outcomes that were ultimately achieved. Through the comprehensive and systematic application of Lorraine Eden's Political Bargaining Model (PBM), this research explores the configurations of negotiation components in the period of 2014-2018. A qualitative approach is employed through archival and document-based research and content analysis based on PBM's operational components of Goals, Resources, and Constraints.

The findings demonstrate that the configurations and interactions between the three negotiation components form a mechanism that triggers transition of bargaining process from conflictual to harmonious, where the amplification of Constraints triggers Stakes equalization, which in turn drives both actors to realign their respective goals and interests in order to reach mutually beneficial bargaining outcomes. However, the development of negotiation components configuration is plagued by three problems that constrain the ability of the government to optimize bargaining outcomes, namely the politicization of Resource Nationalism, the disparity between managerial and operational control over resources, and the contractual lock-in of investment regime. This results in a deal arrangement that is suboptimal from the Resource Nationalism perspective.

Keywords: Political Bargaining, Share Divestiture, Freeport, Indonesia, Resource Nationalism