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**Memorandum for the Joint Committee
on
New Aircraft in Japan (MV-22)**

References:

I. The Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (SOFA)

II. Statement on New Aircraft in Japan (MV-22)

c. This memorandum, including reference b, confirms the safety of the MV-22 flight operations and addresses the basing and operations of the following new aircraft into Japan: MV-22.

d. Reference b includes a description of the aircraft, its safety record, training of its aircrew and maintenance personnel, and flight patterns and operations over and surrounding US facilities and areas, and flight operations in training areas and other airspace.

e. The Governments of the US and Japan will continue their close cooperation on issues of mutual interest, to include flight safety, noise abatement, and low-level flight training, through the Joint Committee and its various subcommittees.

Approved by the Joint Committee on 19 September 2012.

JUNICHI IHARA

**Japanese Representative
Joint Committee**

ANDREW W. O'DONNELL JR.

**Major General, US Marine Corps
US Representative, Joint Committee**

New Aircraft in Japan (MV-22)

- **Overview:** The United States Marine Corps (USMC) will upgrade its aircraft fleet with MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft and remove CH-46 helicopters from service on a one-to-one basis at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. This is part of the USMC process of replacing CH-46 helicopters worldwide with MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft. This is a unit-level upgrade, not a significant change of US presence in Japan. This upgrade also results in no significant change in the number of service members or their dependents in Okinawa.

- **Aircraft Description:**

- a. The MV-22 is a highly capable aircraft which combines the vertical capability of a helicopter with the speed and range of a fixed-wing aircraft. When compared to the CH-46, which was introduced in 1964, the MV-22 is roughly twice as fast, can carry nearly three times the payload, and has approximately four times the combat radius. Deployment of the more capable MV-22 aircraft in Okinawa has strategic significance, and it will further contribute to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the region.

- b. Due to its high-capability and versatility, the MV-22 can also more effectively perform humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and rescue operations in Japan and in the region. It is anticipated that the MV-22 will enable the USG to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations to local communities and the region. Wildland firefighting in the training areas to transport and dump water represents an important function with the MV-22 being able to transport as much as three times the amount of water that a CH-46 can transport. Furthermore, the MV-22 can operate from austere expeditionary sites to provide aid or rescue and can carry 20,000 pounds of cargo at a maximum cruising speed over 260 knots. For example, the MV-22's speed, range, and vertical landing ability enabled transportation of multiple units and relief supplies to remote locations in the disaster relief activities in Haiti in 2010. The MV-22 was also well-suited to safely fly from an amphibious ship in a remote location on the Mediterranean Sea to rescue one aviator from a downed F-15E aircraft in Libya.

- c. Based on the MV-22's successful operational performance and record in the fields of disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and rescue operations, the MV-22 will serve an important role in Japan and throughout the region.

- **Aircraft Safety Record:** Historical data gathered from the past 10 years of flying proves that the MV-22 has demonstrated a safety record that is consistently better than USMC averages.

a. The Government of the United States (USG) is committed to the safety of MV-22 flight operations. The USG reaffirms that the MV-22 will be operated in accordance with the Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) flight manual for the MV-22, enhancing the safety of flight operations, and that the USMC will thoroughly educate and train its aircrew. The USG has well-established procedures for identifying mishap causes and taking appropriate preventative measures to prevent similar mishaps. These procedures include reviewing operations and training to determine whether modifications are required. The USG followed these procedures with the MV-22 mishap in Morocco and the CV-22 mishap in Florida, and the USMC took appropriate preventative measures following these procedures to make appropriate modifications to MV-22 operations and training.

b. The USG has presented to the Government of Japan (GOJ) investigation reports of the MV-22 mishap in Morocco on 11 April 2012 and the CV-22 mishap in Florida on 13 June 2012. The USG assures the GOJ that these investigations were conducted independently and objectively in accordance with relevant regulations and orders. The GOJ proactively reviewed the investigation reports and confirmed the safety of the aircraft. The GOJ was also provided unprecedented access to MV-22 information, and numerous flights and briefings were provided for GOJ officials. In addition, the USG and GOJ conducted extensive consultations in a variety of policy and operational-level venues.

c. The MV-22 has an outstanding safety record as a result of USMC efforts in aggressively documenting and, when appropriate, correcting or revising NATOPS procedures to prevent further mishaps.

- Training of MV-22 Aircrew and Maintenance Personnel:

a. All MV-22 aircrew arriving in Japan will be proficient and possess required qualifications. To receive their required qualifications, aircrew must meet applicable training standards, including those required to respond in aircraft emergencies. To prevent aircraft mishaps, aircrew training includes applicable lessons learned from aircraft mishaps around the world. Because MV-22 aircraft commanders remain responsible for the safety of their aircraft, including the operations of the aircrew, they and other USMC officers in command will continue aircrew training in Japan to maintain their proficiency, increase their qualifications, and promote military readiness.

b. All MV-22 aircrew arriving in Japan will be made familiar with operational requirements (i.e., "Course Rules") and any unique characteristics (e.g., topography, weather) before flying the MV-22 in Japan. MV-22 aircrew will also conduct thorough briefings to review standard operating procedures, aircrew coordination functions, and planned operating areas for each MV-22 flight.

c. All MV-22 maintenance personnel are thoroughly trained in accordance with applicable occupational specialty standards and will incorporate the latest maintenance information and practices to ensure the MV-22 will operate effectively and safely.

- **Flight Patterns and Operations Over and Surrounding US Facilities and Areas:**

a. The USG intends to continue to comply with applicable Memoranda for the Joint Committee regarding Noise Abatement Countermeasures.

b. The USG establishes flight patterns over and surrounding US facilities and areas that minimize the impact of flight operations on the surrounding communities. For this purpose, entry and exit routes for flight operations of the MV-22 should be designed to avoid overflight of densely populated areas, including schools and hospitals as much as possible. While the MV-22 is safe to fly over land and water, the MV-22 will fly over water as much as practicable when transiting.

c. Both flight and ground operations between the hours of 2200 and 0600 are limited to those considered necessary for US operational requirements. Night training flights are limited to the minimum required to fulfill assigned US Forces Japan missions and maintain aircrew proficiency. Unit Commanders will exert every effort to complete night flying operations as early as practical. The USG will minimize the impact of MV-22 night training flights on the communities surrounding Futenma Air Station, including through the use of simulators.

d. The MV-22 will utilize both the established fixed wing and rotary wing traffic patterns and local operating procedures as the basis for arrival and departure of MCAS Futenma to ensure the safe flight operation.

e. The MV-22 normally flies the most time in airplane mode. Except as operationally necessary, MV-22s normally fly in vertical take-off and landing mode only within the boundary of US facilities and areas, and will limit the period of conversion mode as much as possible.

f. After the deployment of the MV-22 in Okinawa, as part of existing programs and with the assistance of the GOJ, the two Governments intend to consider the possibility of conducting its flight training in Japan other than in Okinawa.

- **MV-22 Flight Operations in Training Areas and Other Airspace:**


a. As part of flight operations, to include low-level flights, MV-22 aircrew routinely report obstacles or hazards in the training areas and along training navigation routes. Additionally, aircrew will continuously report the changes to scheduling authorities for dissemination and incorporation into flight planning charts.

b. During flight operations, MV-22 aircrew regularly review and evaluate training navigation routes to ensure maximum safety. Accordingly, the locations of these routes may be modified over time to ensure safety and to minimize the impact on residents of Japan.

c. The USG will conduct its MV-22 flight operations with due regard for the public safety.

d. The USG routinely limits low-level flight training on weekends and Japanese holidays to what it considers essential for US operational readiness requirements.

e. MV-22 aircrew will conduct low-level flight training in Japan because the MV-22 will occasionally operate at low altitudes. While using training navigation routes, the MV-22 will fly at or above 500 feet above ground level, although operational safety may require flying below that altitude. During low-level flight training, it is standard practice for USG aircraft to avoid overflying such places as atomic energy facilities, historic sites, civil airports, congested areas, and other buildings related to public safety (e.g., schools and hospitals).



JOINT STATEMENT OF
THE SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities

October 3, 2013

By

Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida
Minister of Defense Onodera
Secretary of State Kerry
Secretary of Defense Hagel

I. Overview

On October 3, 2013, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) convened in Tokyo, with the participation of both the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and Japan's Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Defense. On the occasion of this historic meeting, the SCC reaffirmed the indispensable role our two countries play in the maintenance of international peace and security and reconfirmed our Alliance's commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional. The two sides also set forth a strategic vision that, reflecting our shared values of democracy, the rule of law, free and open markets, and respect for human rights, will effectively promote peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

At the SCC meeting, the Ministers exchanged views on the evolving security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and decided upon several steps to upgrade significantly the capability of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Our strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities is to be based on revising the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, expanding security and defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, and approving new measures that support the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. The United States also welcomed Japan's determination to contribute more proactively to regional and global peace and security. The Ministers stressed the importance of multilateral cooperation with regional and international partners.

As the United States continues to implement its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region it intends to strengthen military capabilities that allow our Alliance to respond to future global and regional security challenges, including in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace. The Ministers stressed that the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan is to ensure that the U.S. presence maintains deterrence and provides for the capabilities to defend Japan and respond to regional contingencies, while remaining politically sustainable. In this context, the Ministers reiterated the ongoing mutual commitment to complete the agreements on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, including constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and relocating U.S. Marines to Guam, and welcomed the progress made in that regard.

Japan's security policy continues to reflect its long-standing commitment to regional and global peace and stability, as well as its intention to make more proactive contributions to addressing the challenges faced by the international community. At the same time, Japan will continue coordinating closely with the United States to expand its role within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Japan is also preparing to establish its National Security Council and to issue its National Security Strategy. In addition, it is reexamining the legal basis for its security including the matter of exercising its right of collective self-defense, expanding its defense budget, reviewing its National Defense Program Guidelines, strengthening its capability to defend its sovereign territory, and broadening regional contributions, including capacity-building efforts vis-a-vis Southeast Asian countries. The United States welcomed these efforts and reiterated its commitment to collaborate

closely with Japan.

To accomplish our shared strategic vision for the Alliance against the backdrop of a complex regional security environment, the Ministers recognized that the Alliance is the cornerstone of peace and security in the region. Over the next decade, the Alliance intends to continue to address security challenges through close cooperation and a more interoperable and flexible force posture that enables side-by-side and agile contingency response and crisis management. The Ministers affirmed that the Alliance should remain well positioned to deal with a range of persistent and emerging threats to peace and security, as well as challenges to international norms. Among these are: North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and humanitarian concerns; coercive and destabilizing behaviors in the maritime domain; disruptive activities in space and cyberspace; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and man-made and natural disasters. As stated in the 2011 SCC Joint Statement, the Ministers continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its military modernization with its rapid expanding military investments.

The United States and Japan resolve to be full partners in a more balanced and effective Alliance in which our two countries can jointly and ably rise to meet the regional and global challenges of the 21st century, by investing in cutting-edge capabilities, improving interoperability, modernizing force structure, and adapting Alliance roles and missions to meet contemporary and future security realities. To this end, our Alliance should emphasize improved cooperation and coordination, including on information security, equipment and technology, cyber security, and space security, in order to broaden and deepen cooperation across a wide range of Alliance issues.

II. Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

The Ministers pledged to continue deepening the Alliance and directed work on a robust agenda to ensure the Alliance's credibility into the future. Among the tasks before us are revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, expanding our ballistic missile defense capabilities, improving cooperation on emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace, as well as strengthening information security and equipment acquisition collaboration, in order to broaden cooperation across a wide range of Alliance issues.

f. Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation

Recognizing the implications of the evolving regional and global security environment, the Ministers directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, to ensure that the Alliance continues its vital role in deterring conflict and advancing peace and security. The Ministers identified several objectives for this revision, including:

- o ensuring the Alliance's capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, as a core aspect of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation;
- o expanding the scope of cooperation, to reflect the global nature of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, encompassing such areas as counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, capacity building, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and equipment and technology enhancement;
- o promoting deeper security cooperation with other regional partners to advance shared objectives and values;
- o enhancing Alliance mechanisms for consultation and coordination to make them more flexible, timely, and responsive and to enable seamless bilateral cooperation in all situations;
- o describing appropriate role-sharing of bilateral defense cooperation based on the enhancement of mutual capabilities;
- o evaluating the concepts that guide bilateral defense cooperation in contingencies to ensure

effective, efficient, and seamless Alliance response in a dynamic security environment that includes challenges in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace; and
o exploring additional ways in which we can strengthen the Alliance in the future to meet shared objectives.

The Ministers directed that this task for the SDC be completed before the end of 2014.

g. BMD Cooperation

The Ministers confirmed their commitment to enhance the ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities of both countries and welcomed recent progress in this area, including the SM-3 Block IIA cooperative development program. They confirmed their intention to designate the Air Self-Defense Force base at Kyogamisaki as the deployment site for a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system, consistent with the May 1, 2006, SCC Document: "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation." The SCC members also affirmed the continuing goal of expanding bilateral cooperation in this area.

h. Cooperation in Cyberspace

The first U.S.-Japan Cyber Dialogue, held in May 2013, affirmed that the United States and Japan share common objectives in international cyber fora, especially the application of norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace. The Ministers stressed the need for close coordination with the private sector in addressing challenges to the safe and secure use of cyberspace. In particular, the Ministers recognized the need to promote a whole-of-government approach to shared threats in cyberspace.

The Ministers welcomed the signing of a Terms of Reference for a new Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) charged with fostering increased cyber defense cooperation with the improvement of individual cyber capabilities and interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces, which will also contribute to whole-of-government cybersecurity efforts.

i. Cooperation in Space

The Ministers underscored the importance of utilizing capabilities for improved bilateral information collection and sharing related to space situational awareness (SSA) and space-based maritime domain awareness. Specifically, the Ministers welcomed the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan SSA Sharing Agreement and highlighted progress on efforts toward two-way sharing of SSA information. In this context, the Ministers welcomed the commitment of both countries to an early realization of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency's (JAXA) provision of SSA information to the United States.

The SCC members also expressed their desire to improve maritime domain awareness by leveraging satellite capabilities and look forward to future whole-of-government exercises and dialogues on this topic. The Ministers welcomed the establishment of the U.S.-Japan Comprehensive Dialogue on Space to coordinate strategic-level cooperation that promotes long-term sustainability, stability, safety, and security in space. The Ministers also affirmed continued support for multilateral efforts to develop an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.

j. Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities

The Ministers welcomed the establishment of a bilateral Defense ISR Working Group and reaffirmed its mission of encouraging closer Alliance interoperability and information sharing between the U.S. forces and the Self-Defense Forces. They welcomed further progress toward bilateral ISR operations during peace time and contingencies.

k. Joint/Shared Use of Facilities

In order to improve the flexibility and resiliency of the Alliance, as well as to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces posture in areas, including Japan's southwestern islands, the Ministers welcomed the efforts of the Joint/Shared Use Working Group. Progress in realizing the joint/shared use of U.S. and Japanese facilities and areas strengthens the Alliance's deterrent capabilities while building a stronger relationship with local communities.

l. Bilateral Planning

The Ministers welcomed progress on bilateral planning and reaffirmed efforts toward refining bilateral plans so that the U.S.-Japan Alliance can better defend Japan and respond to the range of regional challenges in an evolving security environment. Key components of this effort include strengthening bilateral whole-of-government mechanisms for peacetime and crisis coordination and improving contingency access by U.S. forces and the Self-Defense Forces to facilities in Japan.

m. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

The Ministers welcomed the new linkage established between bilateral discussions at the Systems and Technology Forum and dialogue on Roles, Missions, and Capabilities. This initiative addresses the evolving challenges of the regional and global security environment by enabling increased cooperation in the acquisition of defense systems with Alliance strategy and capability needs. Moreover, through collaboration such as the participation of Japanese industries in the production of the F-35 aircraft, bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology should deepen as Japan examines its Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines.

n. Extended Deterrence Dialogue

The Ministers noted with satisfaction the meaningful outcome of bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogues. This process reinforces the credibility of the U.S. defense commitment to Japan, including through discussions of nuclear and conventional capabilities, and helps to promote regional stability from a near- and long-term perspective. The Ministers also confirmed their Governments' continued commitment to holding the dialogue on a regular basis.

o. Information Security

Enhanced information security continues to reinforce the bilateral relationship of trust and enable broader information sharing between both countries in terms of quality and quantity. The Ministers confirmed the critical role that information security plays in Alliance cooperation and reflected on the considerable progress in strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the protection of classified information made through Bilateral Information Security Consultations. The SCC members particularly welcomed the serious efforts by Japan in establishing a legal framework for further ensuring information security and underscored the importance of closer collaboration. The ultimate aim is to enable our Governments to interact in

real time to address opportunities and crises alike through a dynamic, secure exchange of information.

p. Joint Training and Exercises

In order to enhance and improve effectiveness, interoperability, readiness, mobility, and sustainability of the operations of the U.S. forces and the Self-Defense Forces, and to strengthen deterrence of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the Ministers welcomed progress in peace time bilateral defense cooperation, such as the expansion of timely and effective bilateral training. Bilateral and multilateral exercises, both hosted by Japan and in areas outside of Japan, have improved interoperability and sharpened our ability to deter aggression, defend Japan, and maintain regional peace and security. The Ministers recognized the significant efforts to continue training of Okinawa- based U.S. forces at locations outside of Okinawa.

The Ministers decided to take advantage of the following opportunities to increase training outside of Okinawa, including in mainland Japan, while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the Alliance:

- o Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) drills;
 - o Flight training, through frameworks such as the Aviation Training Relocation (ATR) program;
 - o Artillery Relocation Training, which is under consultation for improvement to better reflect current and future contingency environments;
 - o Other bilateral and trilateral/multilateral training with the partners in the Asia- Pacific region; and
- o MV-22 Osprey, with its unique capabilities, to participate in various operations in mainland Japan and across the region, to reduce the amount of time located and training in Okinawa. In addition to the above mentioned exercises, the Ministers noted, for example, participation of MV-22 Ospreys in exercise FOREST LIGHT, and flight training by MV-22 Ospreys, such as low-level flight training, in-flight refueling training, and logistical support training
- q. Host Nation Support
The Ministers affirmed the continuing importance of the Host Nation Support (HNS) provided by Japan to the continued effectiveness of the Alliance for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

III. Regional Engagement

The Ministers noted that in an increasingly integrated global economy, trilateral and multilateral cooperation is essential. They affirmed that in the next decade, the Alliance is to reinforce a system of international partnerships and multilateral cooperation that preserves and promotes a peaceful, prosperous, and secure Asia-Pacific region. The United States and Japan are committed to working together to increase security capacity regionally in Southeast Asia and globally. Our mutual cooperation is to expand over time, and we are committed to working in partnership with other like-minded countries to build sustainable patterns of cooperation.

r. Regional Capacity Building

The SCC members resolved to build on early efforts to collaborate on partnership capacity building projects in the Asia Pacific region. Cooperating in these efforts is to help ensure regional stability by promoting regional partner security capacities and helping other nations develop their own defense and law enforcement capabilities. The Ministers welcomed the strategic use of Official Development Assistance by Japan, such as providing coastal patrol vessels and training

for maritime safety to regional partners, and recognized the importance of such endeavors in promoting regional peace and stability.

s. Maritime Security

The Ministers affirmed their intent to cooperate further in maritime security and counter-piracy to protect the freedom of navigation, ensure safe and secure sea lines of communication, and promote related customary international law and international agreements.

t. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

Recalling the prompt and effective response by the United States and Japan to recent humanitarian and natural disasters worldwide, the Ministers encouraged efforts to extend bilateral cooperation as well as to promote trilateral and multilateral coordination in international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) and other operations as the circumstances allow, through joint exercises and mutual logistics support.

u. Trilateral Cooperation

The Ministers affirmed the importance of security and defense cooperation among allies and partners in the region and noted in particular the success of the trilateral dialogues carried out regularly with Australia and the Republic of Korea. These trilateral dialogues advance our shared security interests, promote common values, and enhance the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region.

Trilateral cooperation seeks to improve regional security and defense capacities - including humanitarian and disaster relief - in order to support regional peace and stability, helps to promote the freedom of navigation and regional maritime security, and acts as a stabilizing regional presence by building confidence and encouraging transparency in the region. The Ministers urged an increase in the sharing of information among regional allies, including information on operations, plans, exercises, and capabilities, in order to bolster trilateral cooperative efforts further.

• Multilateral Cooperation

The Ministers noted the importance of working together, along with other regional partners, to strengthen institutions that promote economic and security cooperation based on internationally accepted rules and norms, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+).

IV. Realignment of U.S. forces in Japan

The Ministers confirmed that agreements on Realignment of U.S. forces in Japan should be implemented as soon as possible while ensuring operational capability, including training capability, throughout the process. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to ensure the return of the facilities and areas as described in the April 2013 Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa. The Ministers reaffirmed that approximately 9,000 U.S. Marines are to be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan.

The Ministers reconfirmed that the realignment plan described in the 2012 SCC Joint Statement will realize a U.S. force posture in the region that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. This realignment plan will provide the strength, flexibility, and deterrent capacity to respond effectively to future challenges and threats, while also mitigating the impact of U.S. forces on local communities.

- Realignment on Okinawa

The Ministers welcomed the progress on land returns based on the April 2013 Consolidation Plan and stressed their determination to continue efforts toward implementation. In particular, they welcomed the completion of the land return of the north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) in August 2013, and the Joint Committee agreements on an area near Gate 5 of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), the West Futenma Housing area, a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound, and Shirahi River Area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster). These returns are ahead of schedule. Japan welcomed the proactive efforts taken by the United States as shown in the Consolidation Plan that resulted in the creation of an additional land return decision beyond those specified in the April 2012 SCC Joint Statement. The return of a portion of land along the Shirahi River on Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) will enable the local community to develop better flood control measures in the area.

As an essential element of this effort, the Ministers confirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. The SCC members reaffirmed the strong commitment of both Governments to the plan and underscored their determination to achieve its completion, which would permit the long-desired return of MCAS Futenma to Japan. The United States welcomed recent developments including the submission of the request for approval of public water reclamation permit to Okinawa Prefecture by the Government of Japan in March 2013.

The Ministers directed the Joint Committee to reach an arrangement in principle for the partial lifting of restrictions for a portion of the Hotel-Hotel training area off of the east coast of Okinawa, as decided in previous SCC statements, by the end of November 2013. The two sides committed to continue to consult on other possible measures.

The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation to protect the environment and confirmed the importance of making further efforts in environmental matters. Bearing this in mind, the Ministers decided to reach a substantial understanding by the end of November 2013 on a framework for access to U.S. facilities and areas slated for return, for the purpose of facilitating local authorities' planning of land use prior to its return.

- Iwakuni

Regarding MCAS Iwakuni, the Ministers confirmed that the bilateral consultations on the relocation of a KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni would be accelerated and concluded as soon as possible. In addition, the SCC Members affirmed that the Maritime Self-Defense Force would continue to have a presence at MCAS Iwakuni. The Ministers also acknowledged that the relocation of elements of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni should be completed by around 2017.

- Guam

The Ministers confirmed that the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan, including Guam, contributes to sustaining the forward presence of U.S. forces and facilitates the development of Guam as a strategic hub, while also mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

The Ministers announced the signing today of a Protocol to amend the 2009 Guam International Agreement, which forms the basis for the bilateral cooperation necessary to achieve these goals of the relocation.

The Ministers noted the significance of Japanese cash contributions to the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, which benefit the Alliance by supporting the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units to Guam and by enabling the shared use of these training areas by U.S. forces and the Self-Defense Forces. The Ministers directed that consultations on the terms and conditions of such use be initiated within this year.

The Ministers also completed work reflecting the breakdown of costs associated with developing facilities, including training areas, and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands supporting the relocation of U.S. Marines.

The Ministers reconfirmed the relocation plan described in the 2012 SCC Joint Statement. Under the plan, U.S. Marine Corps units are to begin to relocate from Okinawa to Guam in the first half of the 2020s. The Ministers confirmed that this plan's progress depends on various factors, such as measures taken by the two governments to secure appropriate funding. This plan also facilitates progress in implementing the April 2013 Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa.

- Advanced Capabilities

The Ministers confirmed that deployment of more advanced capabilities in Japan has strategic significance and further contributes to the security of Japan and the region. The United States intends to continue to modernize its capabilities. These advanced capabilities include, but are not limited to:

- o The U.S. Marine Corps introductions of two squadrons of MV-22 aircraft as a replacement for the CH-46 helicopter.
- o The first deployment of U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft outside of the United States beginning in December 2013 as part of the gradual phase-out of the P-3 aircraft.
- o The U.S. Air Force plans, beginning in spring 2014, to begin to deploy Global Hawk unmanned aircraft rotationally.
- o The U.S. Marine Corps is beginning to deploy the F-35B aircraft in 2017, the first time these aircraft will be forward-deployed outside of the United States.

(End)

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELOCATION OF III
MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE PERSONNEL AND THEIR DEPENDENTS
FROM OKINAWA TO GUAM

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America,

Affirming that Japan-the United States security arrangements, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, are the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives,

Recalling that, at the meeting of Japan-the United States Security Consultative Committee on May 1, 2006, the Ministers recognized that the implementation of the realignment initiatives described in the Security Consultative Committee Document, "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" (hereinafter referred to as "the Roadmap") will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation, and reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance,

Emphasizing their recognition of the importance of Guam for forward presence of United States Marine Corps forces, which provides assurance of the United States' commitment to security and strengthens deterrent capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region,

Reaffirming that the Roadmap emphasizes the importance of force reductions and relocation to Guam in relation to the realignment on Okinawa and stipulates that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as "III MEF") personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity, and recognizing that such relocation will realize consolidation and land returns south of Kadena,

Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that United States Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam, the KC-130 squadron will be based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and the aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime Self-Defense Forces Kanoya Base and Guam,

Reaffirming that the Roadmap stipulates that, of the estimated ten billion, two hundred seventy million United States dollar (\$10,270,000,000) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide six billion, ninety million United States dollars (\$6,090,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars), including two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly,

Reaffirming further that the Roadmap stipulates that the United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam-estimated in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars at three billion, one hundred eighty million United States dollars (\$3,180,000,000) in fiscal spending plus approximately one billion United States dollars (\$1,000,000,000) for a road,

Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that, within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected, specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam, and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on:

(1) tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, and (2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

- III.** The Government of Japan shall make cash contributions up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) to the Government of the United States of America as a part of expenditures for the relocation of approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam (hereinafter referred to as "the Relocation") subject to paragraph 1. of Article 9 of this Agreement.
- IV.** The amount of Japanese cash contributions to be budgeted in each Japanese fiscal year shall be determined by the Government of Japan through consultation between the two Governments and reflected in further arrangements that the two Governments shall conclude in each Japanese fiscal year (hereinafter referred to as "the further arrangements").

Article 2

The Government of the United States of America shall take necessary measures for the Relocation, including funding for projects of the Government of the United States of America to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam subject to paragraph 2. of Article 9 of this Agreement.

Article 3

The Relocation shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap. The Government of Japan intends to complete the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap in close cooperation with the Government of the United States of America.

Article 4

The Government of the United States of America shall use Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest only for projects to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam for the Relocation.

Article 5

The Government of the United States of America shall ensure that all participants in the process of acquisition for projects to be funded by Japanese cash contributions for the Relocation shall be treated fairly, impartially and equitably.

Article 6

The Government of Japan shall designate the Ministry of Defense of Japan as its implementing authority, and the Government of the United States of America shall designate the Department of Defense of the United States of America as its implementing authority. The two Governments shall hold consultations at the technical level on implementation guidance to be followed by the implementing authorities, and on the specific projects referred to in paragraph 1.(a) of Article 7 of this Agreement. Through such consultations, the Government of the United States of America shall ensure that the Government of Japan shall be involved, in an appropriate manner, in the implementation of the said specific projects.

Article 7

- v. (a) Specific projects to be funded in each Japanese fiscal year shall be agreed upon between the two Governments and reflected in the further arrangements.
- (b) The Government of the United States of America shall maintain a United States Treasury account to which the Government of Japan shall provide cash contributions. The Government of the United States of America shall open and maintain, under the said account, a sub-account for Japanese cash contributions in each Japanese fiscal year.
- w. Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest that is contractually committed to pay for specific projects shall be credited, based on the method of calculation using an index to be agreed upon between the implementing authorities referred to in Article 6 of this Agreement, to the total amount of Japanese cash contributions, which is up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars).

- In case there remains an unused balance of Japanese cash contributions after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for all specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year, the Government of the United States of America shall return the said unused balance to the Government of Japan, except as provided in paragraph 3.(b) of this Article.
 - The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, the unused balance for other specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year.
- 3.
4. (a) The Government of the United States of America shall return interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions to the Government of Japan, except as provided in paragraph 4.(b) of this Article, after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for the last specific projects funded by Japanese cash contributions.
- (b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions for projects funded by Japanese cash contributions.
5. The Government of the United States of America shall provide the Government of Japan with a report, every month, on transactions in the United States Treasury account, including all the sub-accounts related to Japanese cash contributions.

Article 8

The Government of the United States of America shall consult with the Government of Japan in the event that the Government of the United States of America considers changes that may significantly affect facilities and infrastructure funded by Japanese cash contributions, and shall take appropriate actions, taking Japanese concerns into full consideration.

Article 9

1. Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph **d.** of Article 1 of this Agreement shall be subject to funding by the Government of the United States of America of measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement.

e. United States' measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to: (1) the availability of funds for the Relocation, (2) tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap, and (3) Japan's financial contributions as stipulated in the Roadmap.

Article 10

The two Governments shall consult with each other regarding the implementation of this Agreement.

Article 11

This Agreement shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate, at Tokyo, in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, this seventeenth day of February, 2009.

Hillary Rodham Clinton

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF JAPAN:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA: